September 7, 2011
If Russian Authorities Lied About Raoul Wallenberg, Then
What?
by
Susanne Berger (The Global Herald)
Now that researchers have shown in two proven instances
that Russia for many decades has deliberately withheld key
information in the Raoul Wallenberg case, where does that
leave the investigation of his fate?
For
as yet unexplained reasons, Russian officials chose to mislead
for decades not only the general public, but also an official
Swedish-Russian Working Group that investigated the case
from 1991-2001. This group included official Swedish representatives
as well as Raoul Wallenbergs brother, Guy von Dardel.
Russia did not merely obscure inconsequential details of
the case but instead failed to provide documentation that
contains information which goes to the very heart of the
Wallenberg inquiry. These are:
1.
Copies of the Lubyanka prison register from July 23, 1947.
They show that a Prisoner Nr. 7? was interrogated
on that day, six days after Raoul Wallenbergs alleged
death on July 17, 1947. Russian officials did not show
this page to Swedish investigators during the Working
Group, citing privacy concerns. They have
since acknowledged that Prisoner Nr. 7? almost certainly
is identical with Wallenberg.
2.
Investigative material about Willy Roedel, Raoul Wallenbergs
longterm cellmate in Lefortovo prison (1945-1947). In
1993, Russian officials provided the Working Group with
a few loose pages about Roedel. They specifically denied
that any of Roedels interrogation protocols had
survived. Just a few weeks ago, however, researchers learned
that two of these interrogations had been published as
part of a new collection of documentation issued by the
Central Archives of Russias State Security Service
(FSB). It now appears that not only Roedels statements
are available, but that fifty-seven pages from his file
have been deliberately withheld. Some of the material
apparently dates from the years that Roedel spent together
with Raoul Wallenberg.
An obvious
question presents itself: If Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947,
why this grand effort at deception? At the moment, only
one answer seems plausible: Russian officials did not want
to complicate matters, as this information undoubtedly would
have. If researchers had learned in 1991 that Raoul Wallenberg
was alive six days after his supposed death on July 17,
1947, then an all-out effort would have followed to uncover
the full circumstances of his fate.
Similarly,
if investigators had known that large parts of Roedels
file have survived, then quite obviously similar files must
have been created for other key persons in the Wallenberg
drama, such as Wallenberg himself or for Vilmos Langfelder,
Wallenbergs driver who was arrested alongside him
in January 1945. And just as obviously, their files too
may well still remain accessible in FSB archives (After
all, from where exactly did Wallenbergs possessions
magically reappear in 1989?).
So,
what would these papers tell us? Most likely they will reveal
information about Wallenbergs time in captivity, how
he was treated, about his health, about his background,
his experiences and activities in Hungary, and most
importantly about how his case was handled by Soviet
authorities. In fact, if Wallenbergs file also survives
as we now must assume then it would undoubtedly
include information about the genesis of a key document
in his case, the so-called Smoltsov report from 1947, which
announced to the world that Wallenberg had died suddenly
of a heart attack in Lubyanka prison on July 17, 1947.
When
Soviet officials in 1957 released this note from Lubyanka
prison doctor A.L Smoltsov, almost everyone questioned the
details of the story. The general wisdom, however, was that
while this version may not have been true in fact, it was
most likely true in spirit. That is, Wallenberg had most
likely died, but had probably been executed.
The
motives of the Soviet government were quite clear. Officials
wanted to present a credible version of Raoul Wallenbergs
demise in prison without implicating any living members
of the regime. Therefore, the former Soviet Minister of
State Security, Viktor Abakumov, who had been killed in
1954 and A. Smoltsov, who was also no longer alive, were
singled out for blame.
However,
it is equally obvious that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev
in 1989 when he invited Wallenbergs family
to Moscow to present them with his belongings and
later Russian President Boris Yeltsin whose government
in 1991 oversaw the Swedish-Russian Working Group - should
have had full knowledge of both Prisoner Nr. 7? as
well as the existence of Roedels file. Why did they
not order an unvarnished revelation of Wallenbergs
fate at the time? They could have easily apportioned blame
to former Soviet governments for the elaborate cover up
in the Wallenberg case. So, what do the withheld records
contain that still make a full presentation of Raoul Wallenbergs
fate in Soviet prison impossible?
Either
Russian officials simply did not want to expose their predecessors
follies or there is more in the censored files that would
arouse investigators curiosity. For one, if Wallenberg
did not die in 1947 but some years later, it would raise
important questions about both the official Russian and
Swedish handling of the case. Maybe Russian authorities
simply wanted to avoid what they considered to be unnecessary
headaches.
However,
numerous unsolved questions remain about Wallenberg having
possibly survived for years in captivity. What is most upsetting
is that Russia allowed an official commission to waste countless
years and valuable research monies on trying to track down
information that Russian archivists literally had at their
fingertips.
Swedish
officials too should take a close look at how they handled
the Wallenberg inquiry since 1991. It may provide valuable
lessons for future commissions. It is becoming painfully
obvious that relying on a simple qustion-answer format in
politically sensitive cases cannot be trusted to yield fully
reliable information. Swedish officials were urged again
and again by independent experts to insist on direct access
to proffered material, to allow investigators review of
the documentation in the original and in context of the
respective archival collections. The recent revelations
unfortunately confirm that it is impossible to draw valid
conclusions from photocopies alone.
Secondly,
investigators must now assume that all the other alleged
holes in the official Russian record
where documentation supposedly does not exist can
in fact be filled. This includes vital information about
key investigative files from Raoul Wallenbergs fellow
prisoners or other witnesses (often claimed to be lost or
censored, due to privacy reasons); important
information about the system of numbering prisoners (supposedly
destroyed or unavailable); as well
as important correspondence records from Security Services
to the Soviet leadership, including key files of the Politburo
and Central Committee (many equally inaccessible).
Swedish
officials should seize the opportunity to act decisively,
especially with the upcoming festivities in 2012 that will
mark Raoul Wallenbergs 100th year. The Swedish government
has unfortunately relegated the Wallenberg case to a subject
of purely historical inquiry and as such has placed the
onus almost exclusively on researchers to make progress
in the case. Yet Swedish officials know exactly that such
progress can only come from Russian intelligence files
as the recent discoveries confirm that remain out
of reach of investigators. So, the only reasonable conclusion
for researchers to draw is that Sweden, despite its oft-repeated
assertions to the contrary, does not place a premium on
solving the Wallenberg case.
Sweden
already has missed two important chances to press Russia
for clear information. During two official meetings with
President Medvedev in early 2010, Swedish Prime Minister
Reinfeldt and Foreign Minister Bildt chose to address the
Wallenberg case only in the most general terms. They did
not demand immediate full disclosure from Russian officials
about the fact that Wallenberg was apparently alive after
17th July 1947, but instead simply stressed that Sweden
expects an open archival policy.
Things
have improved ever so slightly in recent months, with the
Swedish Ambassador in Moscow formally requesting more specific
information from key Russian archives and unhindered access
to a number of important collections. It is doubtful, however,
that such inquiries on the ambassadorial level alone will
carry enough weight to make a noticeable impact.
What
is needed is an official high-level request from the Swedish
government for full truth in the case, with a small group
of researchers authorized to review critical intelligence
documentation in Russia. The time of doubt whether such
material exists or whether the Raoul Wallenberg case can
be solved is past: Russian officials have wiped those doubts
cleanly off the table once and for all.
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